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Article

Termination of Child Support Obligation Toward a Child Upon a Change of Study Program at University (commentary)

Introduction

The obligation of parents to provide child support is a statutory duty. In general, under Section 62(1) of Act No. 36/2005 Coll. on Family and on Amendments to Certain Acts (the “Family Act”), it applies until the child is capable of supporting themselves. At the same time, it cannot be determined in a blanket manner when a child is considered capable of self-support; this always depends on the individual circumstances of each case.

However, case law has established that university studies are regarded as continuous preparation for the child’s future profession, and due to the time demands of university education, the child is not considered capable of self-support. But what if, after completing one field of study in a bachelor’s program, the child deliberately decided not to continue into a master’s program, but instead began studying in a completely different field?

The ruling of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, file no. 7CdoR/5/2023 of April 27, 2023, published in the Collection of Opinions of the Supreme Court and Decisions of Slovak Courts under no. R 66/2023 (the “Decision”), addressed this very question. Given the interesting legal issue considered, we subject the reasoning of the Decision to closer analysis.

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Briefly on the Facts

The petitioner sought the termination of his obligation to provide child support to his adult daughter (the beneficiary), as well as reimbursement of child support already paid over a period of approximately two years. He argued that his daughter had successfully completed a first-cycle (bachelor’s) program in the field of nursing, and thereafter decided to enroll in a program in general medicine, to which she was admitted and commenced studies.

Approximately two years into her medical studies, the petitioner learned that his daughter was not continuing in nursing at the second-cycle (master’s) level but was instead pursuing medical studies at a different university. The petitioner’s daughter argued that her lifelong goal was to become a physician, but since she was not admitted to medical school immediately after high school, she pursued nursing in the meantime, which helped her prepare for the entrance examinations for medicine.

The petitioner maintained that, during her medical studies, his daughter was unjustly receiving child support, as she had completely changed her field of study (general medicine) instead of advancing her qualification in her prior field (nursing) by completing a second-cycle program.

The petitioner’s key argument may therefore be summarized as follows: the statutory duty to contribute to the support of a child until the child is capable of self-support cannot be applied without limitation to so-called “eternal students,” who repeatedly change their field of study.

Legal Opinions of the Court of First Instance and the Appellate Court

The court of first instance partially upheld the petitioner’s claim, as it terminated his obligation to provide child support to his daughter, but discontinued the proceedings insofar as they concerned the reimbursement of child support already paid. The appellate court, however, did not concur with the petitioner’s arguments nor with the decision of the court of first instance, and it dismissed the petition for termination of the child support obligation.

Chronologically, the first to reject the petitioner’s argument was the appellate court, which stated: “The proceedings did not establish a repeated change of fields of study caused by the respondent’s careless approach to her studies, or even by her inability to make a reasonable effort to achieve her declared educational goal. Nor was there any conduct on the part of the respondent toward the petitioner that could be assessed as expressly intentional or contrary to the principles of decency and morality in society.

In addition, an important fact was that, put simply, the petitioner’s daughter’s primary goal was to become a physician, while her studies in nursing helped her prepare for medical school, since these fields of study are interconnected. The appellate court therefore articulated the legal view that the petitioner’s daughter did not approach her studies carelessly, but instead chose to complete a bachelor’s program in nursing, which provided her with a foundation for studying general medicine.

This commentary primarily focuses on the legal opinion of the Supreme Court of Cassation and its extensive interpretation of Section 62(1) of the Family Act. However, we already consider the appellate court’s opinion insufficient, because we do not believe that the only circumstance warranting termination of a parent’s child support obligation should be a student’s careless approach to his or her studies. Even if the court concludes that the child did not approach the studies carelessly, this, in our view, should not automatically mean that the obligation cannot be terminated; the court should examine other circumstances of the case at hand.

When deciding on the termination of a parent’s support obligation, the court must be guided primarily by the statute, and not by considerations such as whether the daughter enrolled in a related field of study or that her primary goal since high school was to become a physician.

On the Termination of the Parental Duty of Support

According to Section 62(1) of the Family Act: “The fulfillment of the parental duty of support is a statutory obligation, which lasts until the child is able to support themselves.” This means that the decisive moment when the parental duty of support terminates is the child’s ability to support themselves, and not the factual situation of whether the child is actually supporting themselves.

Of course, uninterrupted university studies immediately following high school completion must be taken into account, as they postpone the decisive moment of termination of parental duty of support. Pavelková, in this context, states: “The parental duty of support (from the perspective of the child’s preparation for a profession) ends upon the attainment of the first highest level of education in the regular educational process (the first completed university degree – Master’s). A child’s decision, after completing one university, to continue studies at another university no longer establishes a further duty of support. The child has attained the highest possible level of education in the chosen field and is therefore considered able to support themselves. “

We believe that Pavelková bases her legal opinion on the premise that it is legitimate to support a child during their continuous studies at a university, since, due to the time demands of higher education, a child is rarely able to support themselves. After all, according to Article 4 of the Family Act, all family members have a duty to help one another, and therefore, it is natural that if a child has the ability, talent, and interest to study at a university, their parents should support them in this endeavor (including financially). For this reason, we agree that even income from part-time work, which is usually either irregular or regular but fluctuating in amount, does not relieve a parent of their duty to support the child. However, if the child successfully obtains a second-level university degree, it can no longer be said that they are unable to support themselves, since they have already acquired the education necessary to pursue a profession for which the completion of a second-level university program has prepared them.

In this case, although the daughter did not complete a second-cycle university program in the field of nursing, as Pavelková presumes, under Decree No. 244/2019 Coll. of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research, and Sport of the Slovak Republic on the System of Fields of Study of the Slovak Republic (the “Decree”), a graduate of a first-cycle program in nursing is a qualified healthcare professional with a broad professional profile, prepared to independently perform professional activities. This means that even as a graduate of a bachelor’s program, the daughter could have been employed as a nurse and practiced this profession.

However, the parent’s support obligation would have been extended if the daughter had chosen to increase her qualifications within the same field by immediately enrolling in a second-cycle program directly following her bachelor’s studies, precisely as Pavelková indicates. Yet neither Pavelková nor other legal scholars, to our knowledge, address the situation where a child successfully completes a first-cycle university program and then decides not to continue in a second-cycle program in the same field, but instead chooses to change fields of study completely.

We believe that if this situation is assessed objectively, the daughter in this case acquired the ability to support herself, since she could have been employed in the field in which she graduated. We reiterate that the Family Act does not consider whether the child, given their time or other personal circumstances, is currently able to support themselves. Rather, it considers whether the child has the objective ability to do so. If a child is capable of finding employment and supporting themselves but voluntarily chooses not to continue their studies in the same field, not to seek employment, and instead to pursue a completely different field of study, then in our opinion the parental support obligation ends on the date of completion of the first-degree program at the university. Such a conclusion is consistent with the teleological interpretation of Section 62(1) of the Family Act.

Legal Opinion of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic

Finally, the case reached the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, which, acting as the court of cassation, concurred with the appellate court’s legal opinion. The aforementioned, in our opinion not entirely correct, extensive interpretation of Section 62(1) of the Family Act by the Supreme Court was as follows: “The Supreme Court in this context recalls that parents are responsible for the all-around development of their children, and this also implies that they are obliged to ensure that the child finds a source of livelihood in the field for which they have the abilities and talent, and in which they can be properly applied. […] Such studies should serve to deepen the previous education, which they usually follow, or should lead to better future prospects for earning a living through work.”

In this section, the appellate court referred to a follow-up study, i.e., a study program at the second level of university study following a program completed at the first level, with which we fully agree. At the same time, the appellate court stated that “parents are obliged to ensure that their child finds a source of livelihood in a field for which they have the abilities and talents,” with which we agree, but in our opinion, this should mean that parents should communicate with their child about their university studies after graduating from secondary school and should guide them towards a study program for which they have the ability and talent. At the same time, after graduating in this field, the child will be employable on the labor market. In our opinion, in the context of the Decision, mean that the parent’s maintenance obligation towards the child is maintained if, after successfully completing one field of study in a first-cycle study program, the child decides (arbitrarily) to change their field of study and choose one for which they believe they have the talent and aptitude.

The Appellate Court further stated: “Of course, there may also be a case where further studies will not directly follow the previous studies, but from the specific circumstances, it will be clear that it is still necessary to prioritize the interest in increasing the child’s qualifications, which is precisely the present case. […] Therefore, studying medicine following a three-year program in nursing cannot be considered purposeless; such studies bear the characteristics of continuity and determination and lead to better future prospects of the entitled person in earning a living, and thus the financial resources spent by the child’s parents on such studies undoubtedly contribute to the child’s personal development.”

What, in this case, are the specific circumstances that make it clear that it is still necessary to prefer the child’s interest in increasing their qualifications? Is the Supreme Court referring to the daughter’s assertion that her primary goal since graduating from high school was to become a doctor? We would like to add that the principle of the child’s best interests, laid down in Article 5 of the Family Act, applies exclusively to minors. Therefore, in the case of university students, it should essentially be disregarded. Courts deciding cases concerning adult children are not bound by this principle. For this reason, in the context of a parent’s maintenance obligation toward an adult child, the daughter’s goal of becoming a doctor should not play an important role. In our view, courts should focus solely on the fact of whether the daughter, after successfully completing a bachelor’s program, is capable of supporting herself, as required by Section 62(1) of the Family Act.

We believe that the decision is problematic primarily because it ignores the teleological interpretation of Section 62(1) of the Family Act. Pavelková, in the context of the previously cited arguments, maintains that a parent’s maintenance obligation toward a child continues during the child’s university studies until the child successfully completes a master’s program within the ordinary course of education. However, if the child successfully completes a bachelor’s program in nursing and then decides to study a program in general medicine, this represents a departure from the ordinary course of education. An ordinary course of education would be followed if the child continued to study nursing at the master’s level. This departure, in our view, should be considered a termination of the parent’s maintenance obligation toward the child, since the change of study program, in our opinion, shows signs of arbitrariness rather than continuity.

We therefore view this case differently from the Supreme Court. In our opinion, studying medicine was purposeless and lacked the features of continuity and determination. Continuity and determination would, in our opinion, have been fulfilled exclusively by continuing nursing studies at the master’s level. The element of determination could be met in the case of medicine only if, after failing the entrance exam, the daughter had reapplied the following year and, upon admission, terminated her nursing studies and enrolled in medicine. Her actions would have demonstrated determination even more if she had not enrolled in nursing at all but had instead devoted the entire year to intensive preparation for the medical school entrance exam.

Conclusion

We respect the decisions of the appellate and supreme courts, although we align more closely with the reasoning and conclusion of the first-instance court. Ultimately, we could even agree with the current outcome of the proceedings – in terms of the result, nothing would have changed – but the appellate court’s reasoning would have had to be more persuasive.

We have no doubt that if a child continues their university studies at the master’s level directly following the successful completion of a bachelor’s program, maintaining the parent’s obligation to provide support is fair and appropriate, since such studies demonstrate the continuity and determination to which the Supreme Court refers.

However, changing one’s field of study after successfully completing a bachelor’s program may, in the end, appear to be a tool by which a child can arbitrarily extend the parent’s maintenance obligation, provided that the change of study program can be convincingly justified.

In conclusion, we note that the continuation of a parent’s maintenance obligation after a child changes their field of study is by no means clear-cut, and in our view, this issue provides a solid basis for arguments that differ from those adopted by the appellate and supreme courts.

References

  1. Point 2.2 on page 31 of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic R 66/2023.
  2. PAVELKOVÁ, B.: Zákon o rodine a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. 3. vydanie. Bratislava : C. H. Beck, 2019, p. 388.
  3. Judgment of the Regional Court in Košice of September 30, 2019, Case No. 8Co/23/2019.
  4. Decision of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic R 66/2023, point 14, p. 34.
  5. Points 14 and 15 on page 34 of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic R 66/2023.
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