The evidentiary phenomenon of “claim against claim” and the RAVEN doctrine

1. In this article, we will explore the topic by analyzing a ruling by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic under file number I. ÚS 520/16 , which the court issued in a case where the only relevant evidence obtained was the testimony of the convicted complainant and the contradictory statements of police officers and inspectors, and by analyzing the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic under file number II. ÚS/3044/2022 , which the court issued in a case where the only relevant evidence obtained consisted of the testimony of the convicted complainant and the testimony of his then girlfriend, which was contradicted by the testimony of two police officers. These decisions are, of course, also relevant in the context of the Slovak Republic, even though they are decisions of a foreign state. The decisions in question do not focus on domestic law, but assess whether, in proceedings involving a “he said, she said” situation, sufficient consideration was given to the principle of the presumption of innocence and whether these decisions were sufficiently justified. These issues are assessed in essentially the same way (or at least should be) in the context of continental European law.
2. In the next part of the article, we will look at the current judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the case of E. Adamčo v. Slovak Republic of 01.06.2023 , in which the ECtHR assessed the relevance of evidence consisting almost exclusively of statements made by cooperating persons (so-called repentants), and we will analyze the relevant provisions of procedural rules of civil litigation law that relate to allegations made in civil litigation proceedings.
3. Finally, we will also introduce the RAVEN doctrine, which is a tool (aid) used in judicial practice to assess the credibility of a witness and their testimony.

Analysis of the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case I. ÚS 520/16

1. The complainant was charged with the crime of false accusation, which he allegedly committed by filing a false criminal complaint in response to an incident in which he was first caught by two inspectors riding public transport without a valid ticket, failed to prove his identity to the ticket inspector, a Czech Police patrol was called, and subsequently, during the verbal resolution of the situation outside, the complainant fled ( ).
2. The three police officers and one of the inspectors present began to pursue the complainant and then caught him in the bushes where he was hiding and took him to the police station. The indictment accused the complainant of falsely stating in his criminal complaint that the ticket inspectors had physically assaulted him during the incident, searched his pockets, deleted his private photos and videos, including a video of the incident from his mobile phone, stole his dictaphone and CZK 10,000 in cash, all while the police officers present stood by and watched. He suffered minor injuries in the incident and his laptop bag was damaged. As a result of this report, the police officers and inspectors involved were investigated on suspicion of committing criminal offenses, but these were not proven.
3. The complainant explained his escape and travel on public transport without a valid ticket by financial hardship, while also claiming that the CZK 10,000 he had with him in an envelope was money he had won in a photography competition and that he always carried it with him so that mice would not eat it at home.
4. A psychological assessment of the complainant was also carried out during the proceedings, which showed that he tends to perceive events hypersensitively or exaggerate them. The general courts that found the complainant guilty did not overlook his criminal record, as he had also been convicted of criminal offences against ticket inspectors and other passengers on public transport.
5. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic thus assessed a case in which the general courts found the complainant guilty on the basis of the following facts:
6. several police officers and ticket inspectors testified against the complainant as witnesses, although the police officers and ticket inspectors were not colleagues and apparently did not have a friendly or similar relationship with each other;
7. according to a psychological assessment, the complainant was a person who “tends to perceive things hypersensitively or exaggerate them”;
8. the complainant made truly implausible allegations in the criminal complaint, which were denied by both the ticket inspectors and the police officers;
9. the complainant had demonstrably had conflicts with inspectors in the past;
10. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic did not uphold the convictions handed down by the general courts and overturned them. According to the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic:

“In a situation of ‘he said, she said’, the general courts are obliged to thoroughly assess the credibility of the individual conflicting statements and to proceed with particular care and caution when evaluating these statements and drawing factual conclusions, while strictly respecting the principle of the presumption of innocence. Among other things, in such a situation, general courts must not forget that if there is objective doubt about the disinterest of a witness or witnesses whose testimony conflicts with that of the accused in the outcome of the proceedings. This obligation of general courts is further emphasized in cases where such witness testimony or witness testimonies, which contradict the testimony of the accused, constitute the only direct evidence from which the guilt of the accused is to be proven. With regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial, it is therefore unacceptable to find the accused guilty in a situation where the only direct evidence against him is the testimony of a witness whose interest in the outcome of the proceedings cannot be ruled out a priori, whereas this witness testimony is assessed as credible only on the grounds that it was given under threat of punishment in the event of false testimony.

1. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic therefore took the view that it is inadmissible to convict a defendant solely on the basis of the statements of witnesses who have an incentive to lie. It also rejected the frequent argument of Slovak courts that witness statements are credible (often only) because of the threat of punishment for perjury. Such an argument is, of course, ly incorrect, since if the threat of punishment for perjury reliably deterred every witness from perjury (and thus every witness’s testimony was credible), the number of people convicted of perjury would be zero. The argument in question is therefore based on the fiction that general prevention ensured by the penalty for committing the crime of perjury is perfect, 100% effective.
2. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic took a similar view in another decision analyzed, in which it also did not uphold the presumption of credibility of a witness on the grounds of his membership in a particular profession (police officer).

Analysis of the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case II. ÚS/3044/2022

1. In the contested judgment of the District Court in Benešov, the complainant was found guilty of the crime of violence against a public official under the relevant provisions of the Czech Criminal Code and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, with a conditional suspension for a probationary period of three years. The sentence was a cumulative one, as the court also took into account a previously imposed (but not yet enforced) sentence for another criminal offense (possession of narcotic and psychotropic substances).
2. A significant part of the story that led to the complainant ending up in criminal court is not disputed. It all started with an argument between the complainant and his (then) girlfriend, which took place on a farm they were renting. The girlfriend called the police to resolve the conflict. A two-member police patrol arrived at the scene, but the complainant refused to discuss anything with them (according to him, no conflict had occurred). The police remained at the farm, talked to the girlfriend, and tried to persuade the complainant to cooperate. The situation culminated when the complainant left the patrol, which was at that moment in the farmyard, and entered one of the ground-floor apartments on the side of the farmyard. The complainant’s dog, named H., ran out of the door and immediately attacked one of the police officers (police officer A), biting him on the lower leg. He let go after a few seconds when the second police officer (police officer B) used his service weapon against the dog (the dog was only scratched and survived). Police officer A’s treatment and subsequent incapacity for work lasted approximately three weeks.
3. The fundamental difference lies in the interpretation of the events preceding the dog’s attack. The police officers, acting as witnesses, claimed that the complainant set the dog on them with the words “get them.” In contrast, the complainant insisted that he had not said anything of the sort and had not known about the dog behind the door; his girlfriend had placed it there without his knowledge. When the door was opened, the uncontrollable H. slipped between his legs, and although he called out “come back,” the dog unfortunately bit the police officer. However, it was “only” an unfortunate accident. This version was also supported by the complainant’s girlfriend. The complainant fully acknowledged (civil) liability for the dog’s behavior and paid all damages related to the consequences of the attack, including a compensation agreement with police officer A. However, he rejected the criminal charges.
4. In the contested judgment, the court clearly leaned toward the version of events presented by the police officers. It based its decision almost exclusively on the testimony of the people involved. While it described the statements of the complainant and his girlfriend as unreliable and motivated by an attempt to avoid criminal liability, it did not doubt the truthfulness of the police officers’ statements, because, in its view, they had no reason to lie and would also be liable to punishment for giving false testimony. Although the police officers gave different statements during the preliminary proceedings, particularly regarding the distance between them and the door from which the dog ran out, according to the judgment, these inconsistencies can be understood given that the police officers were at the scene for the first time and the incident happened very quickly. The District Court in Benešov expressed its conviction that, also with regard to the complainant’s personality, his actions were deliberate and that he had incited H. to attack the police officers as a premeditated outcome of the conflict. The complainant used the dog as a weapon and was at least in ndirectly aware that the dog could bite the police officers.
5. In his appeal, the complainant pointed primarily to the flawed course of the evidence and the incorrect factual and legal conclusions drawn from it. He emphasized the contradictions in the statements of both police officers, which the court had not adequately addressed. At the same time, the court did not evaluate the statements concerning the incident in connection with other facts (the distance of the door from the police officers, the visibility of the door due to the thickness of the wall, etc.), which he documented with photographs attached to the appeal. These confirm that the police officers could not have heard any of his statements. The complainant also submitted a confirmation from a dog trainer that H. is uncontrollable and does not listen to any instructions, so it would be pointless to instruct him with the command “take them”. According to the complainant, the conviction was based solely on the court’s conviction, not on the evidence presented. The appellate court rejected the complainant’s objections and found the conclusions of the court of first instance to be correct and logical. It considered the photographic evidence to be irrelevant because the police officers agreed that they were standing in the yard before the attack and following the complainant. The intention to set the dog on the police officers undoubtedly corresponded fully to the complainant’s intention not to communicate with the police officers in any way. If the dog had escaped by accident, the complainant should have tried to call it back, which, according to the police officers, he did not do; instead, he left and did not take any interest in the incident in the yard.
6. The Supreme Court rejected the complainant’s appeal. It found no extreme or obvious contradiction between the factual findings of the courts and the content of the evidence presented. The police officers confirmed in complete agreement and without doubt that the complainant set the dog on them. Unlike the complainant and his then girlfriend, they had no reason to lie. The complainant’s objection that the dog was unsuitable as a weapon because it was uncontrollable does not hold water. On the contrary, if the complainant was aware of the dog’s unpredictability, then when he deliberately released it, he must have assumed that it would attack and bite the police officers.
7. The complainant emphasized that the general courts based their conclusion of guilt on a single piece of direct evidence, namely the statements of both police officers. On the contrary, he and his girlfriend insisted on a different course of events, so it was a classic case of “he said, she said.” The courts did not doubt the impartiality of the police officers, even though they were directly involved in the incident. If the biting of police officer A had been caused by an unfortunate accident, it could have influenced the assessment of the subsequent actions of the police officers (use of service weapons, calling in the SWAT team and a helicopter to the scene of the incident).
8. According to the complainant, the assessment of the statements made by the police officers and his girlfriend was biased against him – if any part of a statement supported the defense (e.g., the police officers’ claim that they did not hear any dog barking), it was ignored, but if it supported the prosecution, it was considered credible (e.g., the girlfriend’s claim that she heard a dog barking). The general courts did not address the contradictions in the police officers’ statements, such as the different determinations of the moment when the complainant allegedly gave the dog the command to attack. Overall, when evaluating the statements, the general courts did not take into account the conclusions of the aforementioned ruling of June 22, 2016, under file number I. ÚS 520/16, according to which it is not possible to give greater weight to the statements of police officers than to those of “ordinary” individuals.
9. According to the complainant, the general courts also committed an excess in their assessment of other evidence. Although a video recording of the incident was available, the court did not address it in any way in the grounds for its decision. The appellate court even interpreted the course of events in a manner contrary not only to the recording, but also to the photographs that the complainant submitted with his appeal. These materials show that, given that the door was hidden behind a thick wall and the police officers were several meters away from it, they could not have heard any instructions given by the complainant to his dog. In this regard, the general courts violated the premise of an increased requirement for justification of a decision in the case of conflicting evidence.
10. The Constitutional Court overturned the contested decisions on the basis of the following legal principles:
11. “A situation where there is only one piece of incriminating evidence in criminal proceedings is, from a cognitive point of view, difficult to assess ( ) and carries the risk of possible errors and mistakes. In such cases, particular attention must be paid to thoroughly examining the only direct incriminating evidence, and such evidence must be carefully evaluated. In the case under review, the general courts expressly acknowledge that the only evidence for the conviction of the complainant was the testimony of both police officers, which, however, was disputed by the complainant and his then girlfriend. This was therefore a typical case of “he said, she said,” in which the general courts should have assessed in detail the credibility of the conflicting statements, again while respecting the principle of the presumption of innocence.

In its judgment, the trial court stated that “the defendant’s guilt was, in the court’s opinion, reliably proven by the statements of both police officers, whose credibility the court has absolutely no doubt about, as there was no reason to believe that either of them would testify untruthfully. The police officers would be subject to criminal prosecution for giving false testimony.’ This reason alone is not sufficient, because the reference to the threat of punishment in the event of false testimony is not proof of the credibility of the testimony, even if the witnesses are police officers.”

1. An analysis of the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic shows that it repeatedly emphasizes the need for increased caution when evaluating conflicting evidence. Of course, it is not enough to simply state in the reasoning for the decision that the court did so, but it is necessary to describe in a convincing and detailed manner the court’s considerations that led it to the conclusion that it incorporated into the ruling.
2. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic has even expressed the opinion that, in the case of justifying a decision in a situation of claim against claim, it is necessary to place increased demands on the justification of the decision compared to other situations:
3. According to the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic under file number III. ÚS 464/99: “One of the main principles of criminal proceedings is the principle of free evaluation of evidence (Section 2(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code), according to which the authorities involved in criminal proceedings evaluate evidence according to their internal conviction, based on careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case, both individually and in their entirety. However, this principle is not and must not be a manifestation of the arbitrariness or capriciousness of the criminal justice authorities. It is necessary to structure it into specific components and criteria. One of the key components is the transparency of decision-making, i.e., the need to describe the evidentiary process in an exhaustive manner and to justify it in a logical and factually convincing manner. This requirement of the legislator has been incorporated into the system of requirements for the reasoning of judgments (Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code).

The aforementioned provision of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code emphasizes the requirements for justification, especially in cases where the evidence presented is contradictory. In a situation of “claim against claim,” it is necessary for the court, from the perspective of both ordinary law and constitutional law (Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 36 of the Charter) to impose increased requirements in relation to drawing conclusions about which facts the court considered proven, on which evidence it based its findings of fact, and what considerations it followed in evaluating the evidence presented.

1. The above premise of increased requirements for the reasoning of a decision, which was already mentioned by the complainant in case II. ÚS/3044/2022, undoubtedly also applies in the Slovak Republic. This follows from the European Convention on Human Rights itself (Article 6(1) – the right to a fair trial) and Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which is incorporated into Article 46 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (the right to judicial and other legal protection).
   1. 1. According to the resolution of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic under file number 5 Cdo 106/2010: “The fact that the right to a properly reasoned court decision is one of the fundamental principles of a fair trial is clear from the established case law of the ECtHR. The case law of this court does not therefore require that every argument of a party, even one that is irrelevant to the decision, be answered in the reasoning of the decision. However, if an argument is decisive for the decision, a specific response to that argument is required (Ruiz Torija v. Spain of December 9, 1994, Series A, No. 303-A, p. 12, § 29; Hiro Balani v. Spain, 9 December 1994, Series A, No. 303-B; Georgiadis v. Greece, 29 May 1997; Higgins v. France, 19 February 1998).

According to the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic under file number I. ÚS 108/07: “In addition to access to court, Article 46(1) of the Constitution also recognizes a certain quality of judicial proceedings, in other words, a fair trial. (…) With the wording used in Article 46(1) of the Constitution, the constitutional legislator expressed in the basic legal regulation of the Slovak Republic the convergence of intentions in the sphere of the right to judicial protection with the legal regime of judicial protection under the Convention. (…) For this reason, no fundamental difference can be seen in the content of these rights.”

According to the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic under file number III. ÚS 311/07: “The right to a fair trial requires that court decisions be reasoned and convincing. (…) This procedure stems from the need for transparency in the administration of justice, which is an essential part of every judicial act. The reasoning behind a decision also guarantees that the administration of justice is not arbitrary.”

According to a decision of the European Court of Human Rights: “The purpose of a reasoned decision is to show the parties that they have been heard. In addition, a reasoned decision gives the parties the opportunity to appeal against the decision and to have it reviewed by an appellate body. Only if reasoned decisions are issued can there be public scrutiny of the administration of justice.” (see, for example, Suominen v. Finland, § 37, July 1, 2003; Tatishvili v. Russia, § 58, February 22, 2007)

According to the resolution of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic under file number 6Cdo/98/2017: “The obligation of the court to duly justify its decision reflects the right of the parties to the dispute to a sufficient and convincing justification of the court’s decision, which deals with all legally relevant grounds of the action brought, as well as with the specific objections of the parties to the dispute. A violation of the aforementioned right of the party to the dispute on the one hand and the obligation of the court on the other hand deprives the party to the dispute (in addition to denying the right to learn about the reasons for the decision in the manner chosen) deprives the party of the possibility of properly arguing against the court’s decision in fact and in law within the framework of the use of any ordinary or extraordinary remedies. The prevention of a party from exercising its procedural rights to such an extent that it violates the right to a fair trial within the meaning of Section 420(f) CSP, a court decision should also be considered deficient if it does not contain any reasons or if it lacks a fundamental explanation of the reasons essential to the decision in the case, or if the arguments contained in the reasoning of the decision are so internally contradictory that the decision as a whole is unconvincing.”

According to the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic under file number III. ÚS 311/07: “The Constitutional Court examined whether the Supreme Court explained to the complainant its reasoning, the manner of evaluating the evidence, the findings of fact, and the legal conclusions drawn in such a way that the result of the decision-making process was clear, comprehensible, and sufficiently justified, and so that the complainant did not have to seek answers to the issues raised through conjecture, so that the conclusions reached could be accepted as the logical conclusion of a process of understanding not only the legal conclusions but also the factual conclusions on which the legal conclusions are based.”

According to the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic under file number III. ÚS 199/09: “A judgment can be considered complete and sufficient if it adequately informs the party to the proceedings of the factual findings and legal conclusions on the basis of which the court assessed the merits of the case and decided. Therefore, if the reasoning contains the basic arguments and proposals of the parties to the proceedings, a calculation of the evaluated evidence and facts that the court considered proven, as well as a comprehensible interpretation of the legal assessment of the facts according to the relevant legal provisions, it fully meets the requirements of § 157 of the Civil Procedure Code.”

According to the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic under file number IV. ÚS 115/03: “Part of the content of the fundamental right to a fair trial is also the right of a party to the proceedings to a judicial decision that clearly and comprehensibly answers all legal and factually relevant questions related to the subject matter of judicial protection, i.e., the assertion of claims and the defense against such assertion.”

According to the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic under file number III. ÚS 307/2012: “The arbitrariness and obvious unreasonableness of decisions by general courts is most often due to a contradiction between their legal arguments and the factual circumstances of the cases under consideration and the rules of formal logic, or the absence of clear and comprehensible answers to all legal and factual questions relevant to the subject matter of judicial protection, i.e., with the assertion of claims and the defense against such assertion (…).”

Ján Drgonec states: “In its position on the reasoning of a court decision as an integral element of a fundamental right under Article 46(1) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and a human right under Article 6(1) of the Convention, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic did not create its own original concept, but adopted the concept from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.”

High-quality reasoning for a decision is therefore in any case part of the right to a fair trial. However, if a decision is issued in a “claim against claim” situation, higher demands are placed on the court, namely that it must convince the addressee with sufficient and reasonable reasoning why it has accepted one claim and not the other. In practice, therefore, it is impossible to rule out cases where, even in a “he said, she said” situation, the court will agree with one of the opposing parties without finding that there is a lack of evidence. However, these should be exceptional cases, for example, where the claim of one party makes logical sense and what the other party claims could not have actually happened (the mere improbability of the other party’s statement is not sufficient). Even in such cases, the court must carefully consider all the circumstances of the case, the motives of the parties making the statements, and justify its decision with a greater degree of explanation of the reasoning that led the court to that decision.

Analysis of the ECtHR judgment in the case of E. Adamčo v. Slovak Republic

1. The topic of this article is also relevant to the recent unanimous decision of the ECtHR in the case of E. Adamčo v. Slovak Republic dated June 1, 2023. The ECtHR examined Mr. Adamčo’s case with the following background:
2. The applicant, E. Adamčo, is a Slovak national born in 1976 and currently serving a prison sentence in Dubnica nad Váhom. In June 2014, E. Adamčo was charged with aiding and abetting two murders.
3. The indictment was based on the testimony of three persons: Person B confessed to organizing one of the murders and is serving a life sentence for several other unrelated murders; Person E, who initially denied any involvement in the second murder but eventually confessed to committing it allegedly with E. Adamčo; Person C, who was also allegedly an accomplice in the first murder, bringing the murdered person with E. Adamčo to Person B.
4. In 2017, E. Adamčo was found guilty and sentenced to 25 years in prison. The conviction was based mainly on evidence obtained from persons involved in the murders, in particular persons B, C, and E.
5. E. Adamčo argued that the persons testifying against him had received benefits from the prosecution in exchange for providing evidence against him. The District Court in Žilina stated that the provision of incriminating evidence by the witnesses in exchange for the benefits they received was within the limits of the law and that the court had examined this evidence and the internal logic and consistency of their statements “with particular care.” E. Adamčo appealed.
6. The Regional Court in Žilina dismissed the appeal and essentially agreed with the first-instance court, its assessment of the evidence, and the reasoning behind its decision.
7. E. Adamčo lodged an appeal and subsequently a constitutional complaint, but was unsuccessful in both the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic and the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic. The Constitutional Court stated that the lower courts had assessed the evidence in its overall context and that it was not possible to conclude that they had failed to take into account the possible advantages granted to the witnesses.
8. Referring to Article 6(1) and (3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to a fair trial), E. Adamčo complained that, since the witnesses testifying against him had cooperated with the prosecution in exchange for benefits, his conviction was unfair.
9. The Government of the Slovak Republic argued that the eyewitness testimony of B, C, and E was not the only evidence leading to E. Adamčo’s conviction. However, the ECtHR noted that other witness evidence was only hearsay and stated that the expert evidence concerned the manner in which the murder was committed, not the identity of the murderer. Therefore, the conviction was based mainly on the testimony of these three witnesses.
10. The question relevant to the ECtHR was whether this evidence had been sufficiently examined in view of the benefits granted to the witnesses in exchange for providing evidence. The Slovak courts considered the inconsistencies between the testimonies and the uncertainty regarding the benefits granted to one of the witnesses to be insignificant.
11. According to the ECtHR, the Slovak courts dealt with some of E. Adamč’s arguments in a manner that distorted the information obtained from the evidence and with reasoning that was not coherent, including justifying inconsistencies in the testimony of person E as a result of stress.
12. The ECtHR ruled that the Slovak courts did not pay any individual attention to the extent and nature of the benefits obtained by witnesses in exchange for incriminating evidence, despite the fact that E. Adamčo specifically pointed this out.
13. These benefits were significant and included the postponement of the prosecution of witnesses for multiple murders. The ECtHR noted that Slovak law did not appear to contain provisions on the granting of immunity and that such agreements had been concluded outside judicial control. According to the ECtHR, E. Adamčo received only abstract answers to his arguments.
14. The ECtHR found that in the case of E. Adamčo v. Slovakia, there had been a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (in concreto, the right to a fair trial), as the criminal proceedings against E. Adamčo did not provide adequate guarantees to ensure its fairness.

Claim against claim in civil litigation

1. According to the provisions of Article 8 of Act No. 160/2015 Coll. of the Civil Procedure Code (CSP): “The parties to the dispute are obliged to identify the factual allegations relevant to the decision in the case (obligation to allege) and to support their allegations with evidence (obligation to prove), in accordance with the principle of economy and in accordance with the instructions of the court.”
2. According to the provisions of Section 149 CSP: “The means of procedural attack and the means of procedural defense are, in particular, factual allegations, denial of the factual allegations of the opposing party, motions to take evidence, objections to the opposing party’s motions to take evidence, and substantive objections.”
3. According to the provisions of Section 150(1) of the CSP: “The parties are obliged to state truthfully and completely the essential and decisive factual allegations relating to the dispute.”
4. According to the provisions of § 151(1) and (2) of the CSP:
5. “Factual allegations of a party that have not been expressly denied by the opposing party shall be considered undisputed.
6. If a party denies factual allegations concerning its actions or perceptions, it shall state its own allegations concerning the factual circumstances in question, otherwise the denial shall be ineffective.”
7. Therefore, if the denying party wishes to effectively deny the factual allegations of the opposing party (rendering them procedurally ineffective), it must:

• expressly deny the factual allegations; and at the same time
• state its own assertions about the factual circumstances in question.

1. Both conditions must be met cumulatively. It is therefore not sufficient to make a vague statement that the party denies a particular factual claim. In such a case, the party runs the risk that the factual claim will be denied ineffectively and the court will generally consider it undisputed. At the same time as expressly denying the factual claim, the party must state its own claims regarding the factual circumstances in question.
2. In civil litigation, therefore, the statements of the parties are given important status by law. The opposing party must always effectively deny material factual allegations concerning its conduct or perception, otherwise these allegations will be considered undisputed.
3. According to the judgment of the Regional Court in Prešov under file number 1Cob/3/2019: “When drafting the CSP, the legislator deviated from the original regulation based on the O.s.p. (Civil Procedure Code, law valid until June 30, 2016) and, when drafting the CSP, introduced the principle of formal truth into the provisions of § 185 CSP, which represents one of the most fundamental changes in civil procedure. Formal truth means that the court based its decision exclusively on the evidence presented to it by the parties to the dispute, while the court does not have to arrive at the complete truth, given that it can only form its opinion of the dispute to the extent that it is presented to it by the parties to the dispute through their claims and related evidence. Emphasis is placed on the procedural diligence of the parties to the dispute, which results in a limitation of the court’s evidentiary initiative and its transfer almost exclusively to the parties to the dispute. According to Section 185 of the CSP, the court may only examine evidence proposed by the parties to the dispute, and it decides which of the proposed evidence it will examine.
4. In view of the above, it can be concluded that in the event of an ineffective denial of the opposing party’s claims, the other party to the dispute runs the risk that the claim in question will be considered undisputed, which, as a result of the principle of formal truth (this principle does not apply in criminal proceedings), even in a situation where the claim that has not been effectively refuted is not true in reality. Such a situation may, of course, also arise in cases where the proceedings (e.g., criminal proceedings) are governed by the principle of substantive truth, if the court, despite its efforts, nevertheless incorrectly determines the facts of the case. In civil litigation, however, the court forms its view of the case only to the extent that it is presented to it by the parties to the dispute through their claims and related evidence, and therefore does not attempt to thoroughly ascertain the facts of the case beyond its assessment in the light of the claims and evidence submitted by the parties.
5. In a situation where one claim is pitted against another without any relevant evidence being provided, the party would prima facie fulfill its obligation to make a claim (Article 8 CSP), but would not fulfill its obligation to provide evidence ( , Article 8 CSP). According to Števček: “The burden of proof also represents a specific procedural obligation imposed on the disputing party – in this context, it is not correct to consider only the plaintiff in relation to the burden of proof. In other words, in an adversarial dispute, the burden of proof does not fall solely on the plaintiff. Anyone who makes a claim in a dispute is obliged to prove it. This means that the defendant also bears the burden of proof as part of their procedural defense and, therefore, the burden of proof. Failure to comply with the burden of proof and, consequently, failure to bear the burden of proof leads to procedural passivity on the part of the defendant, which is also sanctioned by the loss of the dispute. In general, therefore, the burden of proof and the related burden of evidence in a dispute lies with anyone who fulfills their procedural obligation to make a claim.
6. Of course, statements in civil litigation are not only made by the parties to the dispute, but also by witnesses. They have no obligation to provide evidence, so they do not prove their statements, but their statements (testimony) are considered evidence. Therefore, if a model situation arises in which

1. a party to the dispute makes an assertion (fulfilling the obligation to assert) and proves its assertion only by the testimony of, for example, three witnesses (fulfilling the obligation to prove);
2. the opposing party rejects the other party’s claim supported by witness testimony as false, but is unable to obtain objective evidence to prove this (for example, if there are no camera recordings of a certain event, even though people were present);

even civil litigation de facto ends up in a situation where it is one claim against another.

1. The court can only rely on the words of the parties and witnesses, who may lie, so it must carefully assess whether the witnesses who support the party’s claim with their testimony are credible witnesses. If this is not the case and the party does not submit other relevant evidence, it runs the risk of losing the dispute.
2. The so-called RAVEN doctrine, mentioned in the introduction to this article, can assist the court (in both criminal and civil proceedings) in this assessment.

The RAVEN doctrine

1. Recently, the so-called RAVEN doctrine has been used in civil and criminal proceedings to evaluate witness testimony. This acronym is an abbreviation of five words:
   1. 1. Reputation;
      2. Ability to see;
      3. Vested interest;
      4. Expertise;
      5. Neutrality.
2. First criterion (reputation): the overall social position and status of the witness is assessed in the context of their social ties (e.g., a pathological environment of drug addicts, if the witness demonstrably moves in this environment, may have a significant impact on this criterion, etc.).
3. Second criterion (ability to see): the context of sensory perception and the witness’s ability to testify about what they perceived with their senses is assessed, for example, the time lapse between their testimony and the relevant event, age, health, etc. (for example, hearing or visual impairment can significantly undermine the overall credibility of a witness statement in a particular case – this does not, of course, imply discrimination against persons with disabilities in any way, only a limitation of the ability to perceive reality through the senses).
4. Third criterion (vested interest/personal interest): the potential impact of the outcome of the dispute on the witness’s interests is assessed, for example, the impact on their substantive legal position, etc. If, for example, the witness would gain some material advantage or a better material position in the event of one party’s success, this may affect the overall credibility of such a witness (Of course, here too, the overall complexity of the evidence presented is assessed, as well as the individual evidence in a certain complexity, so even such a potential advantage does not disqualify the witness absolutely, but only in the context of the other assessment criteria of the RAVEN doctrine, as well as in the context of the other evidence presented and assessed).
5. Fourth criterion (expertise/knowledge): the witness’s expertise is evaluated. If the witness has proven expertise in the field to which and about which he or she is testifying or to which his or her testimony relates, this has an impact on his or her credibility in the given universe of consideration. For example, if an eyewitness to a traffic accident happens to be an expert in the field of transport, their testimony will have a different “weight,” importance, and credibility in the assessment than the testimony of a person who is not professionally competent in this area.
6. The fifth criterion is (neutrality/(im)partiality): the overall (im)partiality of the witness is assessed. The court must carefully evaluate any bias on the part of the witness in the context of his relationship to a particular person, in the context of other criteria of the RAVEN doctrine, as well as in the context of the overall tone of the witness’s examination – such as how the witness responded to questions from the opposing party or to supplementary questions from the judge in the context of the so-called material conduct of the dispute, etc.
7. The court must therefore consider the results of the assessments according to the individual criteria of the RAVEN doctrine separately and in relation to each other. In general, the more assessments according to individual criteria are to the detriment of the witness’s credibility, the more the witness’s testimony should, so to speak, lose weight.
8. In some cases, a witness’s testimony may lose weight even if only one criterion of the RAVEN doctrine is assessed negatively in relation to the credibility of the witness, if this negative assessment is of such intensity that it raises serious doubts about the credibility of the witness (for example, a witness’s testimony in favor of their partner, to whom they have an unusually and uncritically positive relationship – so-called “obsessive love”).
9. Of course, in practice, there are situations where there are no doubts about the credibility of either of the conflicting witnesses from the point of view of their ambition to lie in their testimony, or there are no known facts that would reduce their credibility. People naturally often interpret events differently, even though they witnessed the same event and have no ambition to lie about it. Furthermore, witnesses often testify about events that happened long ago, and their memories are unclear or poor (even though the witnesses themselves may sometimes claim that they can “swear to” their testimony).
10. In this case, too, the RAVEN doctrine can help the court (or other entity). The RAVEN doctrine is not only used to assess the credibility of individuals in terms of their ambition to knowingly tell untruths, but also serves as an aid in assessing whether the witness is credible in terms of their ability to accurately reproduce an event in which they were or should have been a participant. To this end, the court (or other entity) will find it particularly useful to assess the following criteria: ability to see and expertise.

Conclusion

1. As can be seen from the above, the highest judicial authorities often point out that in the case of the evidentiary phenomenon of claim against claim, evidence must be weighed carefully and witnesses must be subjected to detailed scrutiny in order to remove any doubts about their credibility.
2. The evidentiary phenomenon of one claim against another does not only occur when two people make conflicting claims, but also when two (or more) groups of people make conflicting claims. The evidentiary phenomenon of claim against claim can therefore also occur in cases where, for example, a wife, her mother, and her sister unanimously claim that the husband beats his wife, for which there is no other evidence, and the husband denies this.
3. The court must therefore consider all the available circumstances of the case (the bias of the wife, mother, and sister due to their family relationship, the fact that the husband cheated on his wife before the criminal complaint was filed) and decide whether the statements of one party (group of persons) are credible.
4. To this end, the court may use the RAVEN doctrine, which allows it to thoroughly analyze the credibility of the witness and his testimony. However, it is by no means appropriate to certify the credibility of a witness by merely referring to the threat of punishment for the crime of perjury, as the court cannot know in a specific case what the witness’s attitude is towards committing this crime.
5. It is necessary to assess with particular sensitivity the statements of persons who may gain certain advantages for their statements, for example in criminal proceedings, or the statements of persons who may have other motives for making false statements (e.g., revenge).

References

1. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic under file number I. ÚS 520/16 dated 22 June 2016, available here: https://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/Tiskova_mluvci/Publikovane_nalezy/2016/I._US_520_16_an.pdf
2. Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic under file number II. ÚS/3044/2022 dated 02.05.2023 available here: http://www.pravnelisty.sk/rozhodnutia/a1245-hodnotenie-jedineho-usvedcujuceho-dokazu-ktorym-boli-vypovede-policajtov-aktualne-rozhodnutie-ustavneho-sudu-cr
3. ECHR press release on the ECHR judgment in the case of E. Adamčo v. Slovak Republic available here: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-7663004-10562931&filename=Judgment%20Erik%20Adamco%20v.%20Slovakia%20-%20Testimony%20of%20eyewitnesses%20given%20immunity%20made%20murder%20trial%20unfair.pdf
4. See DRGONEC, J.: Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Commentary. 3rd edition. Šamorín: Heuréka, 2012, p. 739.
5. ŠTEVČEK, Marek. Article 8 [Procedural obligations and procedural burdens]. In: ŠTEVČEK, Marek, FICOVÁ, Svetlana, BARICOVÁ, Jana, MESIARKINOVÁ, Soňa, BAJÁNKOVÁ, Jana, TOMAŠOVIČ, Marek et al. Civil Procedure Code. 2nd edition. Prague: C. H. Beck, 2022, p. 52, margin no. 3.
6. Source of the description of the RAVEN doctrine criteria: ŠTEVČEK, Marek, BAJÁNKOVÁ, Jana. § 191 [Evaluation of evidence]. In: ŠTEVČEK, Marek, FICOVÁ, Svetlana, BARICOVÁ, Jana, MESIARKINOVÁ, Soňa, BAJÁNKOVÁ, Jana, TOMAŠOVIČ, Marek et al. Civil Procedure Code. 2nd edition. Prague: C. H. Beck, 2022, p. 787, marg. no. 2. (description of the fifth criterion of neutrality/(im)partiality adapted for the purposes of the article).